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1 Similar debate is also waged in Norway, albeit on different grounds and by a different constellation of play-
ers (Anon. 2006). Norwegian big vessel owners seem willing to pay a resource rent tax (resursrenteskatt in
Norwegian) in exchange for the political guarantee that quotas will be made transferable and permanent.
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Abstract   Resource rentals can be defined as payments made by the user of a
resource to the stakeholders to whom the payment accrues. Typically, resource
rentals take the form of a payment by a commercial enterprise to the state. Re-
source rentals can be viewed as a tax on resource rents (i.e., on net income
derived from the use of a resource) or as royalties or access fees to a resource.
The Icelandic Fishery Management Act requires that vessel owners pay a re-
source rental in the form of the “catch fee” (veidigjald), which is one of the first
attempts to explicitly use resource rent generated in fisheries as a base for gov-
ernment revenue. This paper first discusses the legislative activity leading up to
the introduction of the catch fee, followed by a discussion of how the Fishery
Management Act defines the fee. Then, the effect of using a quota-lease-charge
rule is discussed and finally there is an evaluation of whether the catch fee is
high enough.
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Introduction
Resource rent can be defined as income from resource extraction in excess of ex-
traction and exploration costs, including return on capital employed (Grafton et al.
2004). Typically, resource rentals take the form of a payment by a commercial enter-
prise to the state. They can either be viewed as a tax on resource rents or as a
royalty or fee for the privilege of accessing and utilizing the resource. Icelandic fish-
eries are a potential and actual source of resource rentals and have generated a heated
debate about to whom the rent should accrue.1 For instance, a lower rental rate wouldMatthiasson 106
reduce the economic benefit to the general public and inflate the benefits accruing to
those who exploit the resource, thereby increasing the value of fishing rights.
Various terms have been used in Icelandic discourse to refer to resource rentals
specific to the fishery sector including: veidigjald (catch fee), audlindagjald (re-
source fee), and audlindaskattur (resource tax). Advocates of the implementation of
resource rentals tend to use terms that associate rentals with a fee, while those op-
posed tend to refer to them as a tax. Hence, it is hard to find a name that is
commonly agreed on. “Fishing fee” is sometimes used as a catchall term. In this ar-
ticle, “catch fee” will be used to refer to resource rentals specific to the fishery
sector as currently applied under the Icelandic Fishery Management Act.
Holders of fishing rights have been opposed to a catch fee because it reduces
the value of their quota holding, all else being equal. Outside of the fishing industry,
opinion has been in favor of implementation of a catch fee. The Social Science Re-
search Institute of the University of Iceland (SSRIUI) and Capacent Gallup gauged
public opinion on this issue in their regular omnibus surveys in 1991, 1998, and
2000. Supporters of resource rentals represent a two-thirds majority in the opinion
polls. That support has not lost momentum through the years. In 1991, 67% of the
respondents in an SSRIUI survey felt that boat owners should pay for fishing rights.
In 1998 and 2000, 68% and 69%, respectively, of respondents in a Gallup survey
were in favor of a catch fee (Morgunbladid 1991; Capacent Gallup 1998, 1991).2
Some proponents have based their support of the catch fee on considerations of
social equity, while other advocates have pointed out that higher catch fees will
make the fishing industry more accessible and attractive to young entrepreneurs by
lowering the price of fishing rights and thus reducing the capital requirement for
new entrants. Economists specializing in public finance usually stress that resource
rentals are less harmful to economic incentives than most other forms of taxation.3
That is because, in theory, correctly adapted resource rentals will affect rent (income
to users of the resource) but do not impose a wedge between buyer and seller prices.
Hence, resource rentals will redistribute the income in the economy, but should not
distort price-signals and incentives to the same extent as do more commonly used
types of taxes.4
The organisation of the remainder of this paper is as follows. First, a short his-
tory of legislative activity leading up to the introduction of the catch fee is given,
followed by a discussion of how the Fishery Management Act defines the fee.
Thirdly, I discuss the effect of the fee collection if the so-called quota-rental-charge
rule is used instead of the catch fee, and finally, I evaluate whether the catch fee is
high enough.
The Resource Committee, the Revision Committee, and the Amendment
to the Fishery Management Act
Further to an amendment to the Fishery Management Act passed by Icelandic Parlia-
ment (Althing) in 2002, the vessel owner holding a quota right is required to pay a
catch fee (veidigjald). This amendment was a long time in the making before being
2 Net income generated through the sale of quota is subject to an 18% capital gains tax according to the
general tax code (Act 90/2003) if not reinvested in fisheries within two years. This taxation can be
avoided if the proceedings are channeled through holding companies in low-taxation countries.
3 The idea that resource rentals are less harmful than other forms of taxation can be traced back to Henry
George (and, according to some, even go back to Adam Smith) (George 1882).
4 A wage tax would insert a wedge between the price employers pay for use of one unit of labour and the
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passed as law. In the debate leading up to parliamentary elections in 1999, the issues
of fishery management and resource rentals were poised to take centre stage, and it
was clear that the advocates of policy change were in a strong position. To defuse
that threat, the government established the so-called Resource Committee, in which
all the political parties represented in the Althing had representation. The Resource
Committee’s mandate was to deliver recommendations regarding the definition of
public stewardship of natural resources, and, furthermore, to advise how to ensure
that potential rent from such resources would find its way to stakeholders, including
the general public.
An interim report containing review papers by several scientists, but no policy
advice, was delivered prior to the elections in 1999 (Forsætisráduneytid/
Audlindanefnd 1999). The final report was not delivered until September 2000
(Forsætisráduneytid/Audlindanefnd 2000). For the fisheries, the majority of the
committee advised rentals either in the form of an annual catch fee calculated in Ice-
landic kronur (ISK) per allotted cod-equivalency (CE) kilo,5 or a retrocession to the
state each year of a given quota share for subsequent auction. However, following a
preliminary provision in an earlier amendment to the Fishery Management Act in
1999, the Ministry of Fisheries had established a second committee, called the Revi-
sion Committee, with a mandate to evaluate and possibly revise the Fishery
Management Act (Sjávarútvegsráduneytid/Endurskodunarnefnd um stjórn fiskveida
2001). The majority of a split Revision Committee adopted the Resource
Committee’s suggestion to use the proposed catch fee per CE kilo. Their intent was
to alleviate public tensions created by the Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) sys-
tem, inaugurated previously and still in use, whereby existing vessel owners were
“grandfathered” into the system so that free quotas were allotted to them. The Social
Democrats, one of the leading opposition parties in the Althing, consequently put on
its program the adoption of the alternate system proposed by the Resource Commit-
tee, the so-called amortization rule.6 The Minister of Fisheries finally proposed the
Amendment to the Fishery Management Act containing a payment formula based on
the recommendations of the majority of the Revision Committee. This formula,
given in equations (1) and (2) below, was represented as a compromise, but was in
effect more or less dictated by a vessel-owner friendly government.
Catch Fee, the Icelandic Version of a Resource Rental



























1 0 398 6 218 17 568 (. ) , , . (1)
5 Allotted quotas in species other than cod are converted into cod-equivalences by a conversion factor.
The conversion factor is calculated as the ratio of average ex-vessel price of the given specie and the
average ex-vessel price of cod during the last “quota” year. The ratios are calculated by the Directorate
of Fisheries and published yearly. The “quota” year is the period from September 1st to August 31st the
following year.
6 The amortization method was originally proposed by “Resources for the People,” a group of academics
and people from non-fishing business organizations. The group did put forward an alternative Fisheries
Management Act (Áhugahópur um Audlindir í Almannathágu [Resources for the Public Good] 2000).
The amortization method shares many characteristics with the Quota Rental Charge method proposed by
Quentin Grafton, discussed below.Matthiasson 108




−− 11 ;  is the ex-vessel
price of catch; Qt
catch
−1  is the quantity measured in terms of CE kilos; Pt
oil
−1 is the price
of oil at time t–1;7 and CPIt–1 is the consumer price index at time t–1. The subscript
“2000” indicates that the value of the index in question should be the average value
for that year. Note that 0.398 was the assumed crew share of catch value in the year
2000,8 ISK 6,218 billion was the assumed oil bill, and ISK 17,568 billion was the
assumed cost of inputs other than labour and oil in 2000.
The catch fee is levied as ISK per allotted CE kilo. The formula for that rate



















−1()  indicates estimated (expected) and/or allotted quotas for the
period t at the beginning of that period. Last year’s values are used for all relevant
parameters except the quota. This is done to reduce ambiguity due to lack of infor-
mation. The fact that quotas for some species (for instance capelin) are not yet
determined when the fee-rate is fixed makes the application of equation (2) a bit dif-
ficult. The catch fee according to equations (1) and (2) amounted to 3.14 ISK per
CE kilo for the fishing year 2004–05. If fully implemented, it would have brought in
ISK 1.5 billion in 2004–05, but a planned phased introduction is in effect such that
the full fee will only be paid in 2009.
Comparing the Catch Fee and “Ideal” Resource Rental
The definition of resource rent given by Grafton et al. (2004) has been cited. A
slightly different definition of the rent is given by K. Moene, “The resource rent is
hence an extra profit, over and above the normal remuneration to capital owners and
workers. All who are participating in the production may earn as much as they could
have obtained elsewhere and still there is a surplus left” (Moene 2002, cited in
Hersoug 2005). Most taxes affect both the income and incentives of the payee. The
incentive effect is triggered when the payee tries to minimize the impact the tax will
have on profits. Taxes on pure rents, resource rents included, have many of the char-
acteristics of a lump-sum tax, as described by Hindriks and Myles (2006), among
others. As a result, they can inadvertently diminish the incentive effect. Hence, ex-
perts in public economics tend to put resource rentals high on their list of things to
scrutinize, as pointed out in the report from the Commission on Green Taxes
(Grønn_skattekommision 1996, 336).
The catch fee fits the characterization made by Heaps and Helliwell (1985) of
“net royalties or taxes based on hypothetical costs,” which by their account are de-
signed to ensure a high degree of rent collection without distorting incentives for
effective resource use. They point out that once the rate is fixed, the individual pay-
ees keep all the cost savings they can generate. They also point out that the biggest
7 Platt’s notification for Diesel Barges FOB Rotterdam Gasoil 0.2%S. The text of law does not explicitly
say if the price index should refer to price development denominated in USD or ISK. The first three
times the fee was levied, the Ministry of Fisheries based the calculation on price development denomi-
nated in USD (correspondence with Arndis Steinthorsdottir 2006). The Ministry of Fisheries used the
price development in ISK in the explanatory notes supplied along with the Proposal for Act of Law in-
troducing the Catch Fee (Ministry of Fisheries 2001–02).
8 Crews are remunerated by share of gross revenue. It is unlawful for owners and crews to split the bill
for leasing quotas. The Fishers Unions have fought such attempts fiercely in the past.Rent Collection, Rent Distribution, and Cost Recovery 109
administrative problem with this type of tax lies in the definition of cost.
Heaps and Helliwell correctly predicted that the definition of cost, and hence of
the resource rent, would be problematic. This is reflected in equation (1), which is
an attempt to measure the resource rent created each year in Icelandic fisheries. Us-
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Here, the resource rent is represented as PQ t
resource
t
resource, and the opportunity cost of
labour employed is represented as WtLt. Assuming that the category “other” includes
all relevant inputs, except oil and access to the fishery resource, including “normal”
payment for capital employed10 and further, assuming that the industry is competi-
tive, acting as a profit-maximizing price taker on markets for products, as well as
for factors of production, so that the expected value for Πt is zero, then the resource
rent is given as:
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The formula of the text of law is a crude attempt to define the resource rent, as it is
based on the questionable assumption that the use of inputs other than labour and
the natural resource was optimal in 2000. It is also limited by the fact that labour is
not valued at its opportunity cost, but at accounting costs. Furthermore, the formula
assumes that none of the inputs besides the resource are earning rents.11
Another issue is that the price of oil was low in 2000 compared to the latter part
of the period under investigation (2006–07). A doubling of the real price of oil is
assumed to induce a doubling of vessel-owner expenditure on oil, ignoring vessel-
owner substitution of oil with other inputs. Furthermore, because the fishers are
remunerated by a share system, their incomes could exceed their opportunity costs.12
Thus, when the price of oil is high, the formula in the text of law systematically
yields an estimate of the cost of oil that is higher than the opportunity cost of that
input. The part of the resource rent accruing to fishers is left untouched by the
catch-fee formula. On the other hand, the formula underestimates the proper remu-
neration for special skills that might be in short supply, such as fishery-specific
organizational skills. It would be ideal if these two effects, the overestimation of
cost of oil and the underestimation of remuneration of special skills, were to cancel
each other out, but that is rather unlikely. Special skills soon lose their value in a
competitive industry, as competitors imitate the practices of the skillful, or as the
skillful use their advantage to acquire the businesses of the less skillful and apply
their superior skills to the expanded business. Hence, it seems safe to conclude that
the formula is not unfavorable towards the payee of the catch fee because it is much











other PQ P Q PQ = −− − [] 1  and would
thus include the resource rent and also take into account the remuneration system used in the fisheries.
10 Normal payment for capital invested, whether supplied by owners or financial intermediaries, would
be included in the “other” category.
11 For example, an owner or an employee of a fishing firm might be endowed with specific organiza-
tional skills not bestowed upon other owners or employees in the sector, resulting in higher profit per
unit of inputs in this firm than in other firms. By the assumptions of the Fishery Management Act, this
extra profit would be indistinguishable from the resource rent.
12 Note that if the share system were to evaluate fishers’ wages at levels effectively lower than their op-
portunity wage, the supply of fishers would dry up. Vessel owners usually have a long list of would-be
fishers on their desks, and wages in fishing are considerably higher than elsewhere, as reported below.
Both facts are clear indications that share wages are in excess of the opportunity wage for fishers.Matthiasson 110
more likely to underestimate the resource rent than to overestimate it, as is clearly
indicated by the comparison of the fee and the short-term lease price in table 1.
How does the Money Flow? First Years.
The catch fee has been levied three times so far at the time of writing. Table 2 sum-
marizes the development of the “exogenous” factors of equation (1), while table 3
highlights the development of the ingredients of equation (2).
The base period refers to calendar year 2000. The account period refers to the
period from 1 May in one calendar year to 30 April in the next. The payment period
refers to the fishery year from 1 September in one year to 31 August the next. Aver-
age CPI index and average Rotterdam oil price index are the index values actually
used by the Ministry of Fisheries in calculating the fee rate (Steinthorsdottir 2006).
The index for the oil price in ISK is calculated by the author using information on
monthly averages of the UK-Brent price (USD per barrel) and the monthly average
for the ISK/USD exchange rate. The development of the two oil-price indexes re-
flects the divergent development of the USD and the ISK between the years 2000
and 2006. The ISK has appreciated against almost all other currencies, but the USD
has been devalued relative to other major currencies.
Table 1
Short-term Lease Price of Quota and the Catch Fee









* Estimated by using figures from the Proposal for Act of Law (Prop. 882/2001–02).
Sources: Ministry of Fisheries (MF), Central Bank of Iceland.
Table 2
Exogenous Parameters
Oil Price Oil Price
Account Payment Catch Value Rotterdam UK-Brent
Period Period 000 ISK (USD) (ISK) CPI
2000 Base Period 100 100.0 199.1
2003–2004 2004–2005 68,184 101 99.9 229.1
2004–2005 2005–2006 69,914 159 131.2 237.8
2005–2006 2006–2007 67,909 212 172.6 248.2
Sources: Statistics Iceland (CPI, UK-Brent price), Ministry of Fisheries (catch value, oil price), Central
Bank of Iceland (exchange rate ISK/USD), own calculation.Rent Collection, Rent Distribution, and Cost Recovery 111
Table 3 reports the actual fee per CE kilo, as calculated by the Ministry of Fish-
eries, taking into account the fact that vessel owners were granted temporary relief
from the full rate during an implementation period. Table 3 also reports the amount
of the fee excluding temporary relief.
The catch fee has been reduced by 25–30% annually in nominal terms since be-
coming effective, in spite of the yearly increase in the fee rate reflecting the effects
of a higher dollar-denominated oil price and steady revenue due to a gradually
strengthening local currency.13
Table 4 shows how the fee would have developed had the ISK-denominated oil-
price index been utilized instead of the USD-denominated index.
Comparing the two tables, it is clear that the reduction in the amount payable as
catch fee, as well as the reduction in the catch-fee rate itself, would have been much
less had the ISK-denominated oil-price index been used. The fee rate would have
fallen by 29% from beginning to end, instead of 54%. The total amount payable over
the three periods would have been ISK 214 million higher than the actual amount.14
Table 3
Catch Fee 2004–2007, Ministry of Fisheries Calculation
Calculated Catch Fee, Catch Fee, Cod
Payment Rent Full Rate Reduced Equivalency, Fee per CE
Period 000 ISK 000 ISK Rate 000 ISK Tons Kilo, ISK
2004–2005 14,608 1,476 876 441,350 1.99
2005–2006 11,261 1,035 743 485,736 1.53
2006–2007 5,873 560 429 469,653 0.91
Source: Ministry of Fisheries.
Table 4
Corrected Calculation of the Catch Fee for 2004–2007, Oil Price in ISK
Calculated Catch Fee, Catch Fee, Cod
Payment Rent Full Rate Reduced Rate Equivalency, Fee per CE
Period 000 ISK 000 ISK 000 ISK Tons Kilo, ISK
2004–2005 13,294 1,263 798 441,350 1.81
2005–2006 12,968 1,232 856 485,736 1.76
2006–2007 8,328 791 608 469,653 1.29
Sources: Ministry of Fisheries and author’s calculation.
13 The fee rate was 6% of calculated rent in 2004–05, 6.6% in 2005–06, and 7.3% in 2006–07.
14 Readers in the USA may suspect that the use of the CPI may imply an overestimation of actual in-
crease in general prices compared to other measures of inflation, and thus overly inflate the cost compo-
nent of the catch fee formula and consequently induce downward pressure on the size of the catch fee.
Those concerns are addressed by the fact that Statistics Iceland frequently changes the weightings used
in the CPI index and states that although the CPI index and the GDP price index do not move in har-
mony, there does not seem to be systematic difference in their movement over time.Matthiasson 112
Quota Rental Charge
In a series of papers, Quentin Grafton proposed a different approach to extracting
some of the fishery rent into the public coffers (Grafton 1992, 1995, 1996). One of
his proposals is to base the charge on the market value of quotas. Grafton’s quota-
rental charge would be some charge rate (ft, say) times the rental value of the quota
allocated to the firm; i.e., fQ ttt
catch Γ . Grafton shows that the charge is non-
distortionary if applied in an environment where all inputs are remunerated by their
opportunity cost. The profit of an Icelandic fishing firm operating under the regime
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Grafton suggests that as some inputs may not be remunerated by their opportunity
cost in the short run, it may not be optimal to set the charge rate so high that all rent
is taxed away. He also notes that it may be hard to observe the market price of quo-
tas in some fisheries and that additional problems arise if only permanent quotas are
traded (Grafton 1992).15
Would it have made some difference to use a quota rental charge instead of the
actual catch fee? The answer hinges on the level of the price of quota. Several mar-
kets for quotas operate in Iceland. A market for permanent quotas exists, as does a
market for the lease of quotas within a fishing year. Grafton (1992) and Newell,
Sanchirico, and Kerr (2005), among others, point out that the price of permanent
quotas should reflect the expected discounted value of marginal profit flow (re-
source rent) accruing in the fishery in the future. Furthermore, they argue that the
price of lease quota should reflect the expected rent within the year, as a would-be
quota holder would not offer to lease quota for a higher price than the resource rent
as defined above; i.e., an amount equal to the revenue to be collected for the catch,
net of all inputs such as oil, labour, or other factors of production. This decision-
making process can be affected by the possibility that an investor who already has
committed capital in a vessel may consider the opportunity cost of capital as sunk-
cost and ignore it when bidding for quotas. If the fishing fleet has considerable
excess capacity, this approach can be widespread enough to affect the market price.
Some observers fear that inexperience of buyers and sellers in the quota market may
affect price formation in such markets (Newell, Sanchirico, and Kerr 2005). These
authors find evidence of increasing sophistication among New Zealand traders. By
2004–05, the bulk of the Icelandic fisheries had been regulated by individual vessel
quotas for almost 20 years. Hence, excess capacity and inexperience could be prob-
lems in given segments of the fleet, but not in the fleet as a whole. It thus seems safe
to assume that in the Icelandic fisheries, the yearly lease price of quota roughly re-
flects the expected resource rent. Table 1 compares the catch fee as calculated by the
Ministry of Fisheries (utilizing the USD-denominated oil price index), and the quota
lease price.
15 Grafton also discusses a profit tax in his paper. The effects of that form of taxation are somewhat dif-
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The concepts of fishery rent and quota lease price are closely linked.16 It is
therefore of importance to observe in table 1 the divergent development of the quota
lease price and the catch fee during the first three years of the catch fee collection.
Clearly, using market data to estimate the resource rent in fisheries yields different re-
sults from those obtained using equation (1), since equation (1) suggests declining value
of the resource rent, whereas market data suggest considerable increase. Several factors
could drive this result. One observer suggests that the ex-vessel price recorded by Statis-
tics Iceland might, in decreasing degree, be fish-market auction prices and, in increasing
degree, be the result of within-firm pricing between same-owner who holds both a ves-
sel and a processing plant (Valsson 2006).17 A low within-firm ex-vessel price of
catch will reduce share payment to crews and serve to lower the recorded ex-vessel
value of catch and at the same time will increase the price a marginal buyer of a
temporary quota would be willing to pay. Valsson (2006) also suggests that owners
of smaller vessels are reorganizing their operations as private companies in order to
utilize favorable new rules in the tax code. Leaving these more esoteric explanations
aside, one can also expect that vessel owners will implement new technology and
manage to reorganize their operations in even more profitable ways as time goes by.
Such developments would not show up in the estimations based on equation (1), but
would show up in the evolution of the short-term price of quotas.
It is also worth pointing out that the cost figures used in equation (1) are de-
rived from the National Accounts of Iceland. The costs are partly constructed and
partly obtained from the books of the fishing firms. Cost of capital was constructed
using information on investment, depreciation, and an assumed real rate of interest
(6%) (National Economic Institute 1991). It is likely that this method overstated the
true cost of capital in the fisheries sector.18 Overestimating the cost of oil and other
inputs in the base year has negative consequences for the amount of the catch fee, as
illustrated by the elasticity of the catch fee with respect to the cost factors. With re-

















































16 The lease price of a kilo of uncaught fish should be high enough to leave a fisher holding the right to
fish indifferent between fishing and leasing it to someone else. In other words, it should be at least as
high as the difference between the ex-vessel price of a kilo and the cost (including cost of labour and
management) of bringing that kilo on shore. Thus, the lease price gives a rough indication of the amount
of the resource rent (i.e., net income) in a fishery.
17 Other methods have been devised to circumvent the share system of fisher’s remuneration. A vessel
owner without quota may agree to catch quota supplied by a processor and pay indirectly for it by ac-
cepting a depressed ex-vessel price for the catch. Fishers’ unions have devoted considerable energy to
uprooting the practice, but their spokesmen are not fully convinced that they have been successful.
18 Assume that a firm goes bankrupt. Some of its creditors lose money. Its vessels are sold to new own-
ers at a lower price than the depreciated historical price of the vessel. Thus the new owner’s cost of
capital is less than the cost of capital faced by the old owner. That fact would not be registered by the
method used by the National Economic Institute.Matthiasson 114
Had the oil or consumables budget mistakenly been overestimated in the beginning,
it would lower the catch fee in all subsequent years. Furthermore, there is no way
that such a mistake could be corrected except by an act of law. To sum up, the catch
fee formula is based on an assumption that the cost structure of the fishing fleet was
frozen at the year 2000 level and as defined in the National Accounts. The develop-
ment of the quota lease price as reported in table 1 indicates that those assumptions
do not square well with facts.
Given the rigidity of the resource rent estimation based on equation (1), it
would be of interest to review an alternative method for levying the resource rent
charge.
Pecuniary Consequences of Utilizing a Quota Lease Charge
If we hypothesize that the quota lease charge method had been written into the Fish-
ery Management Act instead of the catch fee method and that the charge had been
kept constant throughout the period under investigation, what difference would that
have made in terms of income accruing to the public coffers?
Again, more than one interpretation is possible. One could take formula (1) lit-
erally and assume that the intention of the lawmaker was to collect 9.5% of the
resource rent (taking into account the adjustment of the rate in the interim period). A
more pragmatic interpretation is to assume that the rental charge rate would have
been adjusted so that the income accruing from that charge would have been the
same as the income accruing from the catch fee in the period 2004–05 and that the
rental charge rate would be kept constant after that.
Table 5 reports the pragmatic and the literal versions of the quota lease charge.
The figures in table 5 show that the quota lease charge based on the market value of
quota would have resulted in an increase in income accruing to the public coffers
during the period, not reduced income. In the case of the pragmatic interpretation of
the quota lease rule, the income accruing would have been ISK one billion higher in
2006–07 than income accruing based on the existing rules. If the intention of the
lawmaker was to divert 7.3% of the resource rent to the general public in 2006–07,
it is clear from table 5 that the existing law does not yield this result.
Catches of the most important species in Icelandic waters have been decreasing
Table 5
Short-term Lease Price of Quota, Catch Fee, and Estimates of a Quota Lease Charge (QLC)
Rate Total Payment
Payment Catch Fee QLC, QLC, Catch Fee, QLC, QLC,
Period MF Estimate Pragmatic Literal 000 ISK Pragmatic, Literal
 ISK/CE ISK/CE ISK/CE 000 ISK 000 ISK
2004–2005 1.99 1.99 7.38 876 876 3,257
2005–2006 1.53 2.42 8.98 743 1,175 4,362
2006–2007 0.91 3.06 11.32 429 1,437 5,316
MF: Ministry of Fisheries, QLC: Quota Lease Charge.
Sources: Ministry of Fisheries, Central Bank of Iceland, author’s calculation.Rent Collection, Rent Distribution, and Cost Recovery 115
rather than increasing since 2000.19 Hence, most of the increase in the resource rent
must be due to a drive to more cost-effective operation of the fleet, either by using
fewer inputs or by reducing the effective share accruing to crews. Table 5 clearly
shows that the catch fee formula does not yield a response to such changes.
Is the Catch Fee High Enough? Is Cost of Management Recovered?
Conducting fishery management is quite costly. Stock assessment is based on exten-
sive scientific efforts conducted over an extended period of time and considerable
stretches of sea. Enforcement is also very costly in terms of registration systems,
policing, and related activities. Fishing vessels utilize costly infrastructure for navi-
gation and for other coastal services. These costs have traditionally been paid out of
the public purse. Analyses of the size of subsidies in Iceland for the year 2002 have
been conducted by the OECD and others. According to the OCED, the gross finan-
cial subsidies amounted to 3.7 billion kronur that year (Cox and Schmidt 2006). A
study conducted by a master’s student in the Department of Economics at the Uni-
versity of Iceland (Ottosson 2004), and based on definitions of subsidies offered in a
recent FAO report (FAO 2002), it was concluded that the combined cost of direct
transfers, below-cost provision of services, and specific tax exemptions for the fish-
eries sector totaled ISK 3.9 billion. Adding industry-specific regulatory
interventions raised the cost to ISK 5.7 billion. This amounts to between 4.6% and
6.7% of the ex-vessel value of catch. Other studies have either given similar results
(MacAlister Elliott and Partners Ltd. 2001), or much higher estimates
(Hafsteinsdottir, Ragnarsdottir, and Arnason 1999).
A 9.5% catch fee would have contributed ISK 2.1 billion in 2002. Subsidies of
fisheries amount to between ISK 3.7 and 5.7 billion, depending on what is counted
as subsidy. Hence, it is clear that the catch fee is too low, even if used merely as a
means of enforcing cost recovery.
Concluding Remarks
Iceland has introduced a catch fee as a source of government revenue through the
Fishery Management Act, not through the general tax code. The idea is to base the
taxation on the fishery rent with the aim to gear taxation of the fishing sector to-
wards more efficient models. Another aim is to alleviate political dissatisfaction
associated with the grandfathering of fishing rights to vessel owners.
The definition of resource rent used in the catch-fee formula is crude and not
very responsive to changes in the quota lease price. It has been argued forcefully
that the Icelandic catch fee is too low if costs are to be recovered. It is, however, the
first attempt to use resource rent created in fisheries as a base for government rev-
enue, and such experiments are bound to be characterized by trial and error.
Potentially, Icelanders will ultimately have a system where government revenue is
based on rules that are more responsive to changes in the rent and more equitable
than the rules they started out with.
19 Icelanders caught 222,000 tons of cod in 2000 according to the Marine Research Institute (MRI). Ice-
landic cod catches have not reached that level since, and the MRI proposal for 2007–08 is 130,000 tons.Matthiasson 116
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